Apart from the UN Security Council'c enforcement actions resulting in determinations of state responsibility, its decisions have an indirect impact on state responsibility through the imposition of obligations on states by virtue of the UN Charter. e establishment of the ICTY, for instance, was accompanied by a general obligation on states to cooperate with the Tribunal, and sanctions resolutions require that all states take the prescribed measures, whether they include severance of diplomatic relations, or freezing of assets of the named governments or individuals. Sanctions regimes also customarily include arrangements for monitoring compliance with such obligations, and for reporting of their implementation. As far as the counter-terrorism sanctions are concerned, the institutional framework created by resolution ( ), is particularly noteworthy. Arguing in favour of the concept of 'transnational criminal law' , Boister submitted that one of the characteristics that distinguishes ICL sensu stricto from what he called 'TCL' is the institutional density that accompanies certain international crimes, as exempli ed by inter alia the establishment of international tribunals and the recognition of universal jurisdiction for such crimes. Transnational criminal law, Boister pointed out, does not exhibit the same degree of institutionalisation as ICL, even though 'suppression conventions' can have a profound impact on national law and some of them set forth reporting obligations.
e sixteen anti-terrorist conventions and protocols adopted so far within the UN framework do not in general contain genuine monitoring systems.
e Security Council intervention in state action UN Doc. S/RES/ ( ), para. : "Decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs […] to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with requests for assistance of orders issued by a Trial Chamber". Neil Boister, '"Transnational Criminal Law"?' , EJIL ( ), -, at -. e only exception in this regard is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,which provides for a review conference to be convened every ve years against terrorism, in the form of resolution , has nevertheless been unprecedented in bolstering the accountability of states with regard to the ful lment of the anti-terrorist obligations.
e institutional apparatus set forth for the followup of the implementation of resolution bears no resemblance to what was in place before for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the UN anti-terrorist conventions. Not only does the resolution impose far-reaching and temporally unspeci ed obligations on states, it also provides for meticulous monitoring of the implementation of those obligations through a speci c body, the CounterTerrorism Committee (CTC). e open-ended mandate of the CTC, extensive and on-going reporting requirements, coordination of technical assistance and the establishment of an executive directorate for the Committee -the CTED -are all novel features previously unknown to the subsidiary organs of the Security Council, and powerful tools in mainstreaming counter-terrorism policies.
Obligations Concerning the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism
ere is little doubt about the existence of an obligation on states to prevent and suppress terrorist activities in their territory. e origins of this obligation can be traced back to the League of Nations Council decision in relation to the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and the French Minister of Foreign A airs in , which also led to the elaboration of the Convention on Terrorism. , -, at . e Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate was established as a part of the revitalisation of the CTC, bearing in mind "the special nature of resolution ( ), the continuing threats to peace and security caused by terrorism, the important role the United Nations and the Security Council must continue to play in the global ght against terrorism, the need to reinforce the Committee as the Security Council subsidiary body responsible in this area". UN Doc. S/RES/ ( ), Preamble, para. . League of Nations O.J. ( ); on the in uence of the Convention, see Chapter . . .
